ABSTRACT E-health has become a central feature in the agenda of many European legislators. Health information technologies open up new legal issues in the transition from a paper-based framework to a digital one. The paper focus on a specific issue emerging in this transition, the treatment of the so-called «supersensitive data» of minors processed within the legal framework of the «Fascicolo Sanitario Elettronico» (FSE), a patient-centred ehealth system that has been recently defined and regulated in Italian law. After having outlined the general discipline of this system, the paper shows how the right to control their information (in some cases even against the parents' right to access these information) recognized to minors by a growing body of sources of law and case law interpretations is challenged in this new scenario and need to be taken in account when designing the rules and the information flows permitted by FSE systems. In conclusion, some recommendations to ensure the proper design and implementation of a FSE system according to the minors' right to control their information are provided.
Introduction
E-health has become a central feature in the agenda of many European legislators. The transition from a paper-based healthcare management to a digital one is a crucial technological and economic challenge, but it is also raising new legal issues. In fact, technology does not always involve a simple translation of an "analogue" artifact into the digital language, preserving the same set of rules and the rationale of its pre-digital discipline . In many cases, it strengthens the potentiality of the paper-based In this sense, the legal framework of the so-called "minors'
supersensitive data" (that is, information related to sexuality or other health related stigmatising conditions) within a patient-centred health system is a paradigmatic case.
In Italy, a growing body of statutory law and case law interpretations recognises some "areas" of privacy for individuals between the ages of 14 and 18, allowing these latter to operate autonomously and without parental consent in certain circumstances relating to their private lives. The rationale for these provisions is farsighted: in some cases concerning the most intimate and personal aspects of life, adolescents may be discouraged from approaching the public health service, fearing that parents may learn peculiar "supersensitive" information revealing habits or life-styles which would entail the risk of negative reactions toward their sons (for instance, a teenager may fear the punitive reaction from her father learning that she is on birth control).
Therefore, the protection of privacy and the protection of health go hand in hand when it came to minors, at least in some specific situations.
Such a space for autonomy and confidentiality was ontologically protected in the pre-digital healthcare context because of the nature and the informational shortcomings of paper documents. How can such principles be upheld in a digital environment? How can certain data be hidden in a system where in principle everything is traced? Considering that parental authority 3 today implies gaining access to the minor's EHR, how can the previous level of privacy for "supersensitive" data be preserved in the new context up by e-Health?
By adopting a problem-solving approach and focusing on the comparison between the analogic and the digital perspectives, the goal of this paper is to highlight some critical issues that arise in the attempt to balance the privacy protection of the minor and the need to preserve the legal prerogative of parental authority, in the context of the new technologic possibilities of e-health systems. All these factors must be taken into account in the design and implementation of the EHR architecture.
Before getting to the heart of the matter, we have to briefly outline the legal and technological framework of this investigation, i.e. the "Fascicolo sanitario elettronico" (FSE), a patient-centred ehealth system that has been recently defined and regulated in Italian law. Therefore, the FSE is not a prerogative of the professionals contributing to the patient's care. As can be seen in practice, even at an international level, information technology is gradually creating new virtual spaces for patient participation in the management of their clinical data and is restructuring the process of care around the patient. Thanks to the digital architecture, in fact, the subject can participate more consciously in the decision process regarding their care. In this sense, the patient is becoming "the centre of gravity" of the system of management of their health . This trend toward the person-centred care is the distinctive feature of a Personal Health Record (PHR) system, where the patient actively participates in the control and management of the flow of health data.
The "Fascicolo Sanitario
The FSE offers many advantages for the support of an integrated system of health care. The information can be easily shared between authorised users and the different professionals can manage the decision-making process concerning treatment choices in a coordinated way. The more accurate is the collection of data, as long as they are accessible and correctly transposed, the greater will be the goals that the system will be able to achieve. 
The legal issues in the paper-based context
After these remarks on the FSE, we can now better understand the context of the issue concerning the processing of the so-called "supersensitive" data of the minor. However, such an issue needs to be addressed firstly by taking into account the "analogue" legal framework around the minor and the protection of their privacy. As a rule, the child cannot undergo medical treatment unbeknownst to the parents or against their will. In the light of the responsibility and the consequent obligations of surveillance and protection, the parent has the right/duty to know the health conditions of the minor, as well the correlative power to make decisions in the interest of the child [Bonamini, 2011] . The common rationale, underlying the recognition both of the "early self-determination" of the minor in medical treatment and of a sphere of privacy with regard to the processing of health data concerning him or her in the particular contexts already mentioned, is the need to remove a legal requirement that, if unfailingly followed, would cause the child to take evasive strategies, which are followed not only to avoid approaching healthcare services, but also to conceal and hide a pathological state.
In this respect, it is easy to note the link between the selfdetermination of the subject and the privacy and protection In the cases where the minor can act independently without parental consent, the same level of privacy from parental intervention should be ensured, which was easily secured in paper transactions when the medical report was delivered directly to the person concerned.
In addition to these cases, we should also consider those types of data for which it is possible to choose anonymity.
Therefore, in the digital context of the FSE it is desirable to implement a policy of selective data hiding, in order to shield those In addition to these types of data, we have to consider also a type of information, which could be defined "supersensitive per relationem". Such information is a sort of "spy" data, because it is derived from analysis or examinations carried out outside of structures clearly and in advance identifiable as "sensitive", but they are related to the same plan of assistance (for example, a blood test carried out in a laboratory before prescribing a birth-control pill); so, these data may reveal to the parents a situation that the child has the interest to keep private. Such information, being supersensitive by reflex, should enjoy the same discipline of protection and the same possibility of concealing the data, as we have seen within the supersensitive data tout court. Therefore, according to the recommendation, the information architecture should be designed implementing a choice of the data controller: on the one hand, it can prevent that the data set, subject to a special legal regime of anonymity, freely converge within the FSE; or, on the other hand, it can allow the data subject to choose which data can populate the FSE and who is authorised to see it.
The second option seems to be a more suitable solution,
considering both the purpose of the FSE and the right to selfdetermination. However, we have to take into account that the mentioned recommendation is not precisely referred to the minor:
the rationale of the provision is to protect the confidentiality of the adult, disabling the visualisation of certain information to all or some health professionals. On the contrary, in the case of minors, the data hiding should be functional to the protection of the right to privacy (preventing the parent from having knowledge of the information that we have classified as "supersensitive" data) and, through it, of the right to health.
Given this premise, we imagine a more flexible solution for the management of minors' supersensitive data. We suggest a modular access to the minor's FSE, obscuring to the parent exclusively certain types of information from particular departments (obstetrics, gynaecology, family planning counselling and drug services). But for the abovementioned reasons, also the so-called "supersensitive data per relationem" should benefit from the same treatment. It would be necessary to hide all data produced within the entire process of care or counselling, not only considering the formal aspect of the information (i.e. prescription of a contraceptive pill), but above all evaluating it in a dynamic and functional perspective (a blood test is preliminary to the administration of a contraceptive pill by family planning counselling).
In order to avoid general automatism which will simplify the balancing of the different interests in the administration of healthcare services to the minor, it would be preferable to map the "supersensitive" health data produced by the providers according to objective parameters such as type of disease, intervention and purpose.
The data so classified should be concealed or not depending on the will of the person concerned: if the minor can validly consent to treatment, the data so produced should be controlled and managed by the same.
Therefore, the EHR system should not only help prevent visualisation of supersensitive data by the parent, but also by other professionals (e.g. the family doctor) who are not expressly authorised by the person concerned. It would be conceivable to introduce a flagging system, which is activated by the healthcare professional with the permission of the minor: in this way, the latter can choose which data to insert in his or her own FSE, but at the same time can decide whether to inhibit the visualisation of those data by the parent.
On the information technology side, this should translate into a modular regime of access: certain information contained in the minor's FSE should be displayed depending on the user's profile. So, the minor, logging in with his/her own user name and password, should be able to view the "pure" supersensitive data and the supersensitive data per relationem, as in the paper context he or she would be able to consent to the treatment and examine the pertinent medical records. However, at the same time he or she could not have access to the rest of his/her health data, according to the general principles.
The parent, instead, may log in with his/her credentials and view all the FSE of the minor with the exception of those data hidden through the "flag". To ensure an effective confidentiality, parents not only should be prevented from gaining access to that content, but they should not be authorized to view even a single trace of the metadata. In other words, they ought not to know that the minor has hid certain data: this is the "hiding of the hiding" principle.
In any case, it is important to stress that the data hiding is not an impassable wall: the source and the limit of the minor's sphere of autonomy is always the right to health. That means that parents should be informed if their child is facing a pathological situation which requires prolonged treatments or interventions that might permanently reduce their physical and mental integrity, or represent a potential danger for the people who come in contact with them (consider, for example, the case of HIV infection or 20 other infectious diseases) [Vercellone, 2002] .
Conclusions
The Italian law identifies a numerus clausus of cases in which the minor can make some choices, also in the medical and therapeutic field, without the consent of the legal representative. In the selected circumstances, the minor can exclude the parent or the guardian and claim a "right to be left alone". Such a sphere of privacy in the context of an FSE system has to be understood as informational privacy, i.e. the power to control the circulation of data created in those processes of care where the minor can act without the legal representative; and, it is worthy of protection because it is strictly connected to the minor's right to health. The power of self-determination has to be considered in a dynamic perspective: it expands out to prevailing over other interests, such as parental control, when it corresponds to the protection of the minor's health; it compresses and returns within its limits when the right to health can be affected by a rigid protection of privacy.
The rationes of confidentiality, assured to minors in paperbased healthcare, must pass in the transition towards e-health.
Technology has to strengthen and improve a situation already protected by law. Here, then, in the e-health landscape emerging at the national level, it is essential to design the system taking into account the legal framework.
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The proposed solution envisions the system of access and management of the minor's FSE in two steps: in the first instance, it is necessary to map the cases of "pure" supersensitive data and supersensitive data per relationem, considering the local situation and providing only for such data the possibility to activate a flag for data hiding. Secondly, the introduction of the flag would produce a double consequence: the selected data by the minor would enrich his/her data pool, and would be viewable only to the latter. The minor, as data subject, would be the only one able to manage the flow of those data, deciding with whom to share them, including the parents.
In this way, the efficiency of e-health and its aims would be safeguarded, whilst allowing preserving those areas of confidentiality recognised by law to the minor. In the digital context of an EHR system such areas are even more relevant, because they are functional to the effective exercise of the minor's right to health.
The technology should be adapted to the specific needs of this particular case worthy of protection.
In conclusion, in the light of the complexity and the space for interpretation in the discipline of the FSE, we argue that it is necessary to address the problem of the management of supersensitive data in the interest of the minor, since the design phase of the EHR platform, involving all stakeholders, and combining the assessment of the technical, administrative, economic (and local) rules with the legal ones.
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